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1 The evening’s discussion is laid out and analyzed at length in Hobart (1999a).
For exposition here, I have edited the dialogue, which involved three principal
speakers. These were an ex-headman of the village where I work, an old theatre
actor (now in his nineties) and a female actress-dancer in her late twenties and the
daughter-in-law of the ex-headman. The fact that all three are actors is not coin-
cidental, for reasons which will become apparent.
This paper was originally presented to an AMIC-SCS-SOAS conference on Media,
Practice, Antagonisms: Rethinking the Role of Mass Communication Researchers in Asia at
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 11–12th. June 1999.
My thanks to the anonymous reader for The Asian Journal of Social Science, who
made valuable comments on the original draft of this article.
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This article sets out to reﬂect critically on the object of study in media and communication
studies. It argues that not only the conventional analytical categories but also the modes
of explanation and interpretation used are both problematic and Eurocentric, because they
are mediated by a whole series of industrial and intellectual practices which have remained
unacknowledged. The article aims to show how taking media-related practices as an object
of study, requires radical revision to much of media studies. Central among these prac-
tices is commentary of various kinds. The mass media spend much time commenting on
themselves and one another, just as research through questionnaires, focus groups and inter-
views are invitations to participants to comment. Commenting in its many forms emerges
therefore as an important way of indicating how articulation, a central concept in media
and cultural studies, works. Drawing on examples from Indonesia, an analysis of 
commentary provides a way of understanding how audiences relate to media production,
not least because people talk about the mass media and how they are implicated, or per-
haps even disarticulated by the media. In failing to appreciate how commentary works,
media scholars are complicit in this process of disarticulation, a notion elaborated in the
article.
In the summer of 1997, I was involved in a number of conversations with
a group of Balinese villagers about how contemporary mass media was
aﬀecting their lives — a topic upon which people wax lyrical. One evening
the discussion took an interesting turn. Let me give brief extracts.1
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An Ex-Village Headman: If you ask my opinion, if things carry on
for a long time like this. Our grandchildren
will be in diﬃculties, if there isn’t — what
do you call it? . . .
An Old Actor: Turmoil. If there isn’t turmoil, so that every-
thing starts afresh . . .
Self: What do you mean by ‘turmoil’?
Actor: It is everything turned upside down, destruction.
Self: But what’s the use of a war?
Ex-Head: Its use is that everything starts all over again.
After a fresh beginning things are ordered
again . . . You can’t get, as you do now,
people ‘buﬀaloing’.
Self: What’s ‘buﬀaloing’?
Ex-Head: It’s a proverb: those who are already too
big just get bigger. Ordinary people can do
nothing.
Actor: It’s already too late. They can’t lift a ﬁnger.
Ex-Head: For example, they’re like tiny insects, they
count for nothing. Even if I spoke up and
said this or that, no one would pay any
attention.
Actor: The poor are useless. No one believes them.
The rich never think of actually talking with
the poor. If possible, they keep as far away
from them as they can, where the rich can
talk among themselves about whatever. I
don’t think that the poor could succeed in
speaking. Even if they did, they are worth
nothing, no one is listening.
Ex-Head: They show the good life on television. They
provide images of beautiful things, so that
those without will strive for them. The only
problem is that they can’t succeed.
Actor: They haven’t the wherewithal.
Ex-Head: Yes, it’s hard. Why? You can say people
these days, it’s like advertisements. Why
should government promote television the
whole time and only broadcast what comes
across as good? But what’s bad is not, or
is rarely, shown. The theory is ﬁne . . .
Actor: But the practice is a very far cry from that.
Ex-Head: The practice is rotten. It is tantalizing the
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masses, goading them on, so that they will
want to slave away.
Actor: So that they’ll be joyful, for example so that
they will do what they’re told is right.
Ex-Head: Yes. But afterwards there is the practice,
which is diﬀerent. For example, consider
people going on transmigration programmes.
They never show transmigrants starving. It’s
always people who . . .
Actor: Who are happy.
Young Dancer: ‘Successful’!
Ex-Head: Just the ones who have made it. A lot of
people have been duped that way.
Among the points the commentators made were that serious unrest was
not just impending, but necessary to rectify the excessive inequalities between
people. The relationship between the élite and ordinary people had broken
down irremediably. There was no connection between the political rhetoric
and images disseminated on television and how the élite operated in prac-
tice. The poor were not just dispossessed, but had been rendered inartic-
ulate. Mass communication, on this account, was mass miscommunication
and the silencing of the masses.
When I wrote the original analysis of these conversations for a collection
on the impact of globalization in Bali in the late twentieth century (Hobart
1999a), it was politely received and put as the last chapter, a sort of appen-
dix to the more serious matters of Bali’s place in contemporary Indonesia.
After all, what did the musings of a few Balinese villagers really add up
to? As the volume was going to press a year later, the riots in Indonesia
happened which led to the fall of Suharto and the New Order régime. So
the publishers suddenly became anxious for more details. What the com-
mentators had to say was no longer a mere ethnographic curiosity: they
had predicted what the mass media and most serious intellectual authorities
had failed to. Moreover, these villagers had anticipated much of the sub-
sequent media commentary within Indonesia and abroad, which relegates
the vast majority of the population as ‘masses’ or ‘the poor’, who have 
to be spoken for because they are — or, rather, have been rendered —
inarticulate.
Why Anthropology?
The problem of how to imagine, study and engage with ‘the masses’ in
mass media takes us straight to a constitutive problem in media studies.
Namely it is not a single discipline, but a site of contestation among diverse
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2 The editors of Public culture in Chicago and (then) lone ﬁgures like Faye Ginsburg
and Debra Spitulnik had recognized the importance for anthropology of cultural
and media studies respectively.
approaches across the human sciences, which reveals the incompatibility
between them. The conjunction of media and communications studies dis-
guises inherent antagonisms, which split many academic departments.
For convenience, we may trace the emergence of mass communications
studies to the post-World War II period, when the European model of
empire was being supplanted by the American dream of a modern consumer
society. The imperative of communicating the message of modernity and
how to achieve it engaged the obvious, and appropriately positivistic, dis-
ciplines of sociology and psychology. They drew upon a muscular, realistic-
sounding and so convincing rhetoric from political economy, which neatly,
but not accidentally, dove-tailed with the agendas of western governments
and corporations. It was in part in opposition to this triumphalist grand
narrative of the new American imperium that cultural and media studies
developed in post-imperial Britain to question these myths of capital and
power. As much a series of intellectual arguments informed by post-
Gramscian thinking and punctuated by formative ruptures as it was a con-
ventional ‘discipline’ (Hall 1996), cultural studies, with a distinctive culturalist
turn, and its empirical or ethnographic oﬀ-shoot, media studies, attracted
attention from feminism and literary criticism inter alia. Cultural anthro-
pology, which thought that it owned the franchise on ‘culture’, has largely
stayed aloof and indeed ignorant of what was happening, apart from a
handful of anthropologists who recognized the climactic change going on.2
How have all these diﬀerent disciplines, each with distinct intellectual his-
tories, formative debates, presuppositions and ways of conducting business,
co-existed and contributed to a broader understanding of mass media
around the world at this gargantuan intellectual fest?
Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging that the mass media com-
prise so complex, diverse and changing a congeries of institutions, prac-
tices and human subjects as to be beyond the scope of any single approach,
human scientists have mostly settled back to doing what they do best —
coincidentally reminiscent of Orientalist accounts of Hindu-Buddhist kings.
That is they have dreamed up scenarios in which they (and their disci-
plines) are sovereign, a source of enlightenment and central to the known
world, while all others are subordinate, marginal or irrelevant. One disci-
pline however positions itself as dominant. In eﬀect the late-comers, the
culturalists, literary critics and feminists, constitute oppositional voices to
the entrenched mass communication specialists. Signiﬁcantly, the rival theo-
retical positions reﬂect deep divisions in the history of philosophy of the
human sciences themselves. Mass communications appeals to a vision of
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social science, which aims to replicate the rigour of theory and method 
of the natural sciences. The language is of facts, testing hypotheses and
methodologies, which is attractive to governments, corporations and fund-
ing bodies who want to be able to present the world as tidy, measurable
and so knowable, and under control.
The problem is this vision of natural science is a nineteenth-century
idealization of both the nature of theory and scientiﬁc practice, as philoso-
phers and historians of science have long noted. It is with the shortcomings
of attempts to scientize the complexity, diversity, historicity and even con-
tingency of media practice that alternative approaches have taken issue.
As the philosophical arguments upon which these approaches draw is pre-
cisely the later critique of hegemonic naturalism, it is hardly unsurprising
that the outcome is antagonistic. While cultural and media studies schol-
ars like to present themselves as the radical vanguard, ironically, as Chen
Kuan-Hsing has pointed out (1996), they in turn have extraordinary diﬃculty
in seriously engaging with more radical French post-structuralism.
Where does anthropology come into all this? If we recognize that,
realistically, no single discipline can adequately encompass so widespread
and general a phenomenon as the mass media, then anthropologists are
potentially qualiﬁed to contribute in several ways. The one which concerns
me here is with rethinking the object of study.
Political economic and sociological macro-models were never designed
to address production, distribution or reception treated as practices, nor
the lived daily worlds of journalists, broadcasters, readers or viewers, nor
the complex social contexts in which the media work. In short ‘the mass
media’ are essentialized out of a gamut of media-related practices, which
remain eﬀectively unstudied. While macro-level analyses of global and
national media industries may provide useful descriptions, they are largely
unempirical and mediated. That is they are high level and potentially prob-
lematic abstractions from observable practice. Crucially they involve inter-
mediate objects — for example ‘the average’ (Hacking 1990) in order even
to start imagining audiences (hence the legendary problems of ‘audience
studies’). In a serious sense, the economy, the polity, media industries, glob-
alization, indeed the entire vocabulary of mass communication is itself
mediated, because such terms are not natural entities but the products of,
and inextricable from, innumerable acts of commentary by politicians,
industrialists, ﬁnanciers, media commentators and academics. With such
questionable objects of study (far removed from the paradigms of the nat-
ural sciences), no wonder incantations about methodology are wheeled 
in to cover the epistemological incoherence. And to study media without
recognizing the mediated nature of the inquiry and its objects of study is 
circular.
Two questions follow. The ﬁrst is how might we avoid the potentially
vicious circularity which besets human scientiﬁc inquiry, about which scholars
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3 Such cultural translation applies as much to contemporary media industries as
to the remote tribal peoples, with which the discipline is associated. The point of
Kuhn’s The structure of scientiﬁc revolutions was that even natural scientists have their
own social communities of practice which are not simply reducible to the canons
of rationality, but are inherently cultural.
4 The narrowness of mass communications is evident in the failure to recognize
as diﬀerent as Foucault (1970) and Habermas (1987) concur? Reﬂexivity
has its limits, because the criteria of judgement are themselves wrapped
up in the ‘methodology’. The notion of critical, or ethnographic, under-
standing oﬀers one possible way forward. The second issue, which will
occupy much of this piece, is the relevance of a missing object of study —
commentary.
Ethnography by participant-observation is often trumpeted as anthro-
pology’s main contribution to the human sciences. Considered as a practice,
it is obvious though that, however brilliant and deep the insights, ethnography
is inevitably something of a glorious muddle, not some methodological solu-
tion. The value of ethnography is, I suggest, quite diﬀerent. Growing out
of the long-term implication in some other people’s ways of living, it lies
in the ethnographer’s recognition that she is positioned between two partly
incommensurable discourses — the analyst’s world as academic and cul-
tural subject, and the understandings, arguments and working presupposi-
tions of the subjects of study — between which no resolution or synthesis
is possible.3 The lack of synthesis however makes for critical distance and
inhibits circularity.
Ethnographic understanding involves appreciating how people judge
and comment on their own practices, while simultaneously analyzing the
circumstances under which such practices occur, employing current acad-
emic criteria. This understanding is critical in the strong sense that is not
only critical of the object of study, but of the practices and categories of
the knowing subject, the analyst’s own. It is in this encounter that the
ethnographer is confronted by the Eurocentrism of her own thinking and
presuppositions. It follows that, if research is not simply to reiterate hege-
mony, such cultural translation must be dialogic, again in the strong sense
that academic presuppositions and practice themselves are continually called
into question and interrogated through the dialogue.
The relevance to Asian scholars and media practitioners should be
obvious. With the growth of both media industries and media studies across
much of Asia, the phase of acquiescing to Euro-American hegemony requires
questioning, if Asians are to appreciate the richness and diversity of media
practices and production across the continent and allow these to inform
their critical thinking.4 More speciﬁcally, for Indonesians the way that mass
communications naturalized a narrow vision of development and the polity
makes critical engagement with both the media industries and communications
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historical diversity and cultural context. It parallels facile essentializing about Asian
media and even ‘Asian values’ (see Chua, B-H 1995) as if there were some natural,
timeless entity called Asia.
5 Many of the ideas about how radically to rethink media and ﬁlm studies,
including the relevance of intermedia commentary, have been worked out over the
years with my colleague, Ron Inden.
studies vital if the reform process is to be anything more than empty ges-
ticulation.
Even allowing for recognition of media-related practice and the impli-
cation of people as subjects in the mass media, how can the opinions of
a handful of Indonesian villagers matter? What after all, have they to say
that could possibly be relevant on such a lofty topic? What I hope to show
here is that what ordinary viewers have to say requires us to rethink the
object of study in communication and media research, and so what we
are doing in fundamental ways.
Such rethinking is, I would argue, overdue. The question is why have
so few people challenged existing approaches over their manifest Eurocentrism?
Unfortunately most scholars are too deeply invested in the status quo to
wish to cut their own throats. And the studies which claim to make a
break from this intellectual hegemony (e.g. Shohat & Stam 1994; Curran
& Park 2000; Erni & Chua 2005) all too often end up, ironically, to para-
phrase one title ‘re-westernizing media studies’. The reasons are simple.
Insofar as what is at issue is only the immediate object of study imagined
unproblematically as non-Western or Asian media, the theoretical frame-
works and goals remain unquestioned. Recognizing how hegemonic the
epistemological practices of media studies in fact are falters at the next
step, namely how to step outside this seemingly all-embracing discourse.
Even were it desirable, is it possible to avoid Eurocentrism? After all,
are the modes of inquiry and the academic institutions themselves not
inescapably ‘Western’? Implicit in such arguments is an elitism which priv-
ileges expert and scholarly knowledge and ﬁnds it hard, as the old actor
above remarked, to listen to anyone else. A myopic narcissism is at work,
which ignores quite how much and how varied what is going on is. For
instance, immediately, there is a long history of discussion, argument and
reﬂection about Asian media, not least by the media themselves — what
I call ‘intermedia’ commentary.5 To dismiss the working practices of those
who are ‘organically’ engaged (Gramsci 1971), whether as producers, audi-
ences or critics is not just bad manners, it alienates people from their own
thinking.
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6 The kind of realism and pseudo-empiricism widely found in mass communi-
cation studies is a version of philosophical substantialism; see Collingwood 1946:
41–45.
Media versus Communications studies
How might diﬀerences between communications and media studies bear
on the kinds of issues outlined above? What do these diﬀerences actually
boil down to in diﬀerent regions of Asia in the twenty-ﬁrst century? What
happens if, instead of attempting to explain everything using the old, formal
dichotomy of theory and methodology, we inquire about diﬀerences in
intellectual practices and their genealogies?
For a start, is it possible to rethink the relationship between naturalist
or substantialist and critical-cultural schools of thought, without having to
dismiss one as trivial or unimportant?6 What if they are diﬀerent phases
of inquiry? The Oxford philosopher, R.G. Collingwood, argued that empir-
ical and philosophical modes of inquiry are distinct. If you are research-
ing, say, television-viewing or the ownership of mobile phones, it makes
sense in the ﬁrst instance to assume you can work with, and allocate 
evidence into, distinct classes (what constitutes ownership, viewing, social
class, occupation, etc.). In short, when you begin to inquire about a phe-
nomenon, you assume that it is approachable in terms of discrete and
unambiguous categories. You do not worry too much at that stage how
epistemologically or ontologically justiﬁed they are, whether they are a
combination of popular and scholarly ideas, or how much they are them-
selves mediated.
When you have reasonably established what sort of phenomena you
are dealing with, a diﬀerent phase of inquiry begins, in which you start
to reﬂect on what it is you have established. This latter, Collingwood called
the ‘philosophical’ phase of concepts, where categories overlap and do not
permit closure. The question then becomes: what signiﬁcance do the ﬁndings
have for our broader understanding (1933: 21–53)? At this stage new ques-
tions arise, such as what are the practices which underpin industrial processes
of production or how do broad statistical trends in viewing relate to indi-
viduals and the circumstances of their viewing? Such critical reﬂection may
well lead to asking new questions and so a new phase of empirical inquiry.
Is this distinction a useful way to consider diﬀerences between naturalist
and critical cultural schools of thought?
Rephrasing the diﬀerence between schools as one of practices of inquiry
raises the question of what are the implications of adopting one approach
rather than another. The diﬀerences are at once theoretical and practical.
In other words, they are what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouﬀe called
‘antagonistic’ (1985: 91–148). Apart from antagonisms arising from diﬀerences
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7 Media coverage of ‘a range of topics are widely recognised as oﬀ limits, and
have been dubbed with the mnemonic “miss sara” which refers to anything deemed
seditious, insinuating, sensational, speculative, or likely to antagonise ethnic, reli-
gious, racial or “group” (class) tensions’ (Hill 1994: 45), cited in Fox n.d.
8 As elsewhere, much concern is invested in the sexuality of women. For ﬁlm
Sen (1982) addresses the way women are portrayed as dependent and sinful, while
Heider (1991) notes how social and domestic conﬂicts are resolved through the
physical or emotional suﬀering of the women involved.
9 The exception is the series SiDoel Anak Sekolahan, Si Doel the educated. Derived
from a popular ﬁlm, the hero, played by the original boy actor makes it through
the educational system, but decides to quit, to drive a jitney bus and return home,
where he is surrounded by the usual caricatures of the Indonesian poor. That this
of class and relations of production, other modes of diﬀerentiating humans
as subjects become pertinent, be they relations of gender, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, age, diﬀerential positioning with access to knowledge or what-
ever. On this account, by its nature, society does not submit to a single
explanation, because it is neither a total, nor a coherent, entity (Laclau
1990a.). Insofar as media and communication are social activities, the same
holds for them. There are always antagonistic explanations of society and
social action. So,
antagonism as the negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of
that order, and not the moment of a broader totality in relation to which
the two poles of the antagonism would constitute diﬀerential — i.e. objec-
tive — partial instances (Laclau & Mouﬀe 1985: 126).
In reﬂecting on diﬀerences between communications’ and media studies,
we shall have to consider the limits of each in understanding mass media
in contemporary Paciﬁc Asia.
On my understanding of Laclau and Mouﬀe, the antagonisms of ana-
lytical interest may or may not be manifest in explicit conﬂict. While the
New Order strongly discouraged media coverage of a range of sensitive
topics, notably those dealing with ethnicity, religion, race and interest group
or class,7 this simultaneous substantialization and avoidance tends to dis-
tract attention from the constitutive antagonisms. Once recognized, it
becomes evident that these were, and are, played out every day right across
the mass media. For example, the contradictions and incoherencies of mas-
culine authority and power are displaced onto women, whether, for instance,
as dangerously independent career women or cruel step-mothers and moth-
ers-in-law in Indonesian soap operas, or the staple ﬁgure of the woman-
as-suﬀering in cinema.8 Equally striking is the portrayal in television of
working class people as ugly, ill-educated, stupid, instinctual, clumsy and
often comical.9 The denials and disarticulation involved are remarkable for
being so un-remarked on.
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series consistently scored top ratings, yet none of the television companies got the
point and decided to portray the struggles of able working class people is telling.
10 Sometimes this diﬀerential order is summed up as (H)adat, on which the clas-
sical reference is Schärer (1963). Since the end of the New Order, magazines and
television programmes devoted to ‘mysticism’ have burgeoned. Dismissed by secu-
lar rationalist and Islamists alike as dangerous and reactionary, I would argue that
these are popular ways of questioning the dominant political and religious move-
ments which continue to disarticulate ordinary Indonesians by referring to alter-
native ways of understanding power and human motivation.
11 There is therefore always a constitutive outside inherent in any antagonistic
relationship (Laclau 1990a: 9). The notion of a constitutive outside, which Laclau
derives from Henry Staten’s (1986) reading of Derrida, turns out to be a ﬂexible
and powerful means of analyzing antagonisms, which are sutured over, notably in
the mass media.
Other aspects of the cultural diﬃculties in recognizing issues of class
and power are evident to ordinary viewers like the Balinese villagers men-
tioned earlier, if not to the media producers. Let us consider the main
ways in which the polity and models of political relations have been rep-
resented on television since the 1990s. Brieﬂy we can broadly distinguish
two kinds of representations. The ﬁrst is a hierarchical model of social and
cosmic division of labour in which diﬀerent kinds of beings have exclusive
functions and where power is distributed in complex, often non-manifest
ways.10 The second is what, for lack of a better expression, I shall call
democratic capitalist models, diﬀerent interpretations of which underpin
the conﬂict between New Order, secular reformist and moderate Islamist
visions.
These two pairs of paradigms are not simply related as ‘traditional’
and ‘modern’ models, as both have long been invoked in Indonesian polit-
ical discourse. What each involves depends on who is representing it, as
what, under what circumstances — which is where the mass media come
in. Antagonisms arise in at least two diﬀerent ways. First, in social life
humans as social agents are caught up in complex and untidy relation-
ships, which are not reducible simply to neat logical structures of classes,
roles etc. Second, even in the classic case of a worker selling his labour
in the market, that does not in itself make the capitalist relationships of
production intrinsically antagonistic (Laclau 1990b: 9). Extrinsic factors,
such as a fall in the standard of living in the model of capital or the man-
ifest abuse of reciprocal obligations according to the social and cosmic
order, bring about antagonisms.11 The latter point was clearly stated by
the Balinese commentators. The glaring disparities of wealth and life choices
that daily confront Indonesian television viewers expose the limits of both
orders.
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This brings us ﬁnally to the issue of that much over-used term, hege-
mony. On this account hegemony rests upon antagonism. It is how the
imbalance between the poles of an antagonism is articulated at any moment.
Hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that
it can take place only in a ﬁeld dominated by articulatory practices. This,
however, immediately poses the problem: who is the articulating subject?
(Laclau & Mouﬀe 1985: 134).
So the social is the product of articulatory practices, notably by the media.
Several questions then arise. Who, or what, are the agents, instruments
and patients (recipients) of these hegemonic articulations? How would we
set about studying them? What is the role of academics in researching and
writing about, and so articulating these articulatory practices? And how do
the kinds of articulation communications studies’ scholars make diﬀer from
those of media studies’ scholars? And, ﬁnally, what is the relationship of
academics to the articulating subjects and to the objects of articulation?
Practice versus structure
Few terms have been used as indiscriminately in the human sciences in
recent years as practice. The phrase ‘media practices’ falls easily oﬀ the
lips, but what exactly do those who use it mean by it? In the absence of
a coherent account of practice as an ontological object, it seems to con-
note little more than disaﬀection with the formalist vocabulary of structure
and process, with perhaps a frisson of political radicalism by association
with the almost equally problematic Marxist notion of praxis. A workable
account of practice however might bridge some diﬀerences between sub-
stantialist and critical approaches to media. Practice invites empirical
research, but extends to include the intellectual practices of the researchers,
so making the study critical, in the strong sense above of being reﬂexively
critical of both the researcher’s practices and presuppositions. The scope
for historical and ethnographic study into media-related practices is vast
and still largely uncharted. No theoretical notion is unproblematic: the
shortcomings of ‘practice’ as a notion will no doubt emerge as critical
research gets under way.
Are existing theories of practice not adequate? What, for instance, of
the work of Pierre Bourdieu? As Richard Jenkins argues (1992), Bourdieu
never addressed the radical ontological or epistemological problems, which
a more rigorous account of practice would require. Instead he used prac-
tice to supplement the inadequacies of structure, as a prop to compensate
for the more glaring inadequacies of notions of system and structure.
Bourdieu retained a surprisingly conservative ontology. Consider, for instance,
what is presupposed in the idea of symbolic capital (a hybrid of a Romantic
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12 Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice.
But it is local and regional . . . not totalizing. This is a struggle against power,
a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invis-
ible and insidious. It is not to ‘awaken consciousness’ that we struggle (the
masses have been aware for some time that consciousness is a form of knowl-
edge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of the
bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted along-
side those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe dis-
tance. A ‘theory’ is the regional system of this struggle (Foucault 1977a: 208).
Foucault was then clear that an analysis based on practice upset the cosy rela-
tionship of intellectuals with their object of study, the implications of which com-
munication and media studies needs urgently to take account.
13 I take practice to be a recognized set of actions which aﬀects the world or
agents, or commonly both in diﬀering degree and kind. Activities I consider to be
congeries of actions in which people engage either less formally or where not much
is changed by doing so. Sitting university ﬁnals exams and going ﬁshing are examples
of a practice and an activity respectively. As we shall see, under what circum-
theory of the sign coupled with a deeply contested nineteenth century
notion) or the dichotomy implicit in a ‘theory of practice’, 1977.) We have
to turn to the work of Foucault to ﬁnd a serious analysis of practice, with
an appreciation of the radicality demanded by philosophical pragmatism,
in which the pseudo-naturalist neutrality of the scholar as knowing subject
is clearly revealed as an inextricable part of the problem.12 I take Foucault’s
shift from an archaeological to a genealogical method to be such an attempt
(e.g. 1977b). Foucault was particularly interested in the diﬀerent modes by
which human beings are made subjects and are transformed — or trans-
form themselves — through their knowing practices (1982: 208). The media,
I suggest, are such a mode. And they involve two related sets of practices:
those by which people change themselves or are changed; and those by
which they become objectivized through their implication, or engagement,
in the media.
Rather than talk of ‘media practices’ however, I prefer the expression
‘media-related practices’. It may be the residual anthropologist in me, but
it is the range of contexts and situations in which media become relevant,
which seem as interesting as what goes on in the media themselves. Anyway
it is hard to determine where you would draw the boundary. If house-
wives cook to have meals ready for the family to watch television, or fam-
ilies save up to buy a new set, media conglomerates deciding strategies to
increase market share or what politicians say — and more importantly do
not say — seems to me at least as interesting as media practices more
narrowly deﬁned.13 On this account media-related practices do not form
a closed ﬁeld: they are incomplete and open.
How does a concern with practice diﬀer from other ways of con-
ceiving of the object of media studies? It is an attempt to break away from
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stances commentary is a practice as against an activity, may be crucial. My usage
is consonant with the main senses of practice in the Oxford English Dictionary.
14 ‘Who’ here questions the kind of agent, which may well not be an individ-
ual person, but a complex and changing grouping (Hobart 1990)
15 I carefully avoid describing such critical thinking as ‘postmodernist’, for rea-
sons outlined, for instance, by Baudrillard (1993).
a long-standing explanatory dichotomy between structure on the one hand
and individual agency on the other (replicated, for example, in Giddens’s
theory of structuration, 1984), as if these were the only alternatives. Instead
of the object of inquiry being timeless and unsituated, the shift in emphasis
is to more historical and anthropological concerns, perhaps crudely summed
up in such questions as: ‘What happened, and what was presupposed, on
particular occasions?’ ‘Who represented this as being what, to whom, and
under what circumstances?’14 Applied to media, the second pair of questions
is signiﬁcant because, on most interpretations, they involve communication
and mediation and so take us to issues of the media on the media — or
‘intermedia’. Inquiry into practice then assumes some kind of prior inquiry
into how mass media are conceived and organized, which mass commu-
nications is designed to address. However recourse to ideas of practice is
not simply another stage of inquiry, because in many senses it marks a
rupture. Theoretically, any serious recourse to practice questions the pre-
suppositions of preceding approaches. In the stronger versions, such rethink-
ing is often designated as ‘post-structuralist’.15
As the term suggests, such an approach aims to go beyond ideas of
structure and its associated concepts, whether formal, such as system; or
distributional, as in (social) organization; or supplementary, as are ideas of
process. Socially, structure is not a natural fact. When we describe the
media in terms of institutions or legal corporations, we are invoking a cul-
turally and historically speciﬁc genealogy of argument. Similarly, if we are
studying, say, patterns of cinema-going in India or sampling responses to
television programmes in Singapore, as Ian Hacking pointed out (1990),
we are invoking a kind of fact invented in mid nineteenth-century Europe:
the statistical fact or the ‘normal’. If we are considering the impact of
entertainment media on audiences, then we are assuming some account of
agency.
In media and cultural studies, structure stands in an ambivalent rela-
tionship to culture, the semiotic, or meaning. At one extreme, structure
(often linked in some way with the ‘hard’, masculine realities of economics
and politics) determines, or at least is a good way of explaining, culture
(as ‘soft’, malleable, feminine). At another, culture is the domain of human
imagination, through which humans free themselves from, and come to
understand the workings of, structure itself. More radically, structure stands
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in opposition to contingency, to the questioning of the predictability or
explicability in the last resort, of what happens (Laclau 1990b). It is the
activity of the knowing subject upon the world, which creates, or reveals,
that structure. So recourse to structure opposes the knower to the known.
The sort of analysis of practice I am advocating takes issue with all these
assumptions.
Some brief examples from cultural studies may make the point. A fea-
ture of the work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies was the extent to which it enshrined and played with, rather than
transcended, the dichotomy between cultural voluntarism and structural
determination (exempliﬁed in Hall 1980). As Chen has pointed out, Cultural
Studies has notably failed to address the potentially radical dissolution of
its constitutive categories by post-structuralism (1996).
The problems surface in a well known critique of popular culture and
cultural populism, McGuigan complains of Fiske’s work on television (1987),
that he
says next to nothing about institutional change in television during the 1980s:
vital issues to do with de-regulation / re-regulation and technology, for
instance, are simply banished since, for Fiske, they are not pertinent to ques-
tions of interpretation . . .
Following Bourdieu, Fiske separates ‘the cultural economy’ (symbolic
exchange between texts and audiences) from ‘the ﬁnancial economy’ (where
the television industry is located). Fiske believes it is completely unnecessary
to interpret the meaning of the former in relation to the commercial oper-
ations of the latter . . .
A satisfactory theory of television, I would suggest, needs to account for
the multi-dimensional interaction of production and consumption at both
economic and symbolic levels, giving due weight to textual diversity and
audience diﬀerences, as Fiske rights recommends (McGuigan 1992: 71–72).
The trouble is that McGuigan, in a blast from the past, reinscribes the
dichotomy for which he attacks Fiske and cheerfully reiﬁes the economic,
symbolic, production, consumption, audiences and so on. Although McGuigan
might seem here to give equal weight to the economic and symbolic, the
point of the book is to remind readers just how far popular culture is in
the grip of powerful and determining economic structures. In practice how-
ever, commercial interests cannot simply be separated from ‘content’. And
what exactly are scholars doing when they dichotomize the economic and
semantic? For all their claim to radicalism, most of the protagonists in the
debates around cultural studies seem ﬁrmly entrenched in the metaphysics
of a Eurocentric modernism.
Am, I not just reifying practice in a new set of objects, such as ‘com-
mentary’? I think not. In some ways, what I mean by commentary is close
to the French discours, the open and unbounded discussion that is part of
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almost any social activity or practice, which became substantialized as ‘dis-
course’ in English-speaking translations. An interesting aspect of recent
work on audiences is precisely that it does not attempt to essentialize the
audience as a natural object. Instead it considers those practices of media
institutions, governments, academics and others, through which they describe,
survey and imagine in diﬀerent ways audiences as diﬀerent kinds of enti-
ties (e.g. Ang 1991, 1996; Hartley 1992, 1999; Morley 1992; for Indonesia,
see Kitley 1998). Equally there are problems in essentializing diﬀerences
between producers, distributors and audiences into bounded compartments.
Producers regularly meet as audiences to view and judge their own and
competitors’ productions.
The claims of commentary
Rethinking the object of media studies as those practices which go on in
and around the mass media suddenly makes it clear how little we know
and how much we still have to investigate. Practice is often invoked as a
way, as Ien Ang put it, of ‘desperately seeking the audience’. While it is
the complexities of researching audiences which has attracted the most
attention, ethnographic studies of how diﬀerent kinds of media production
or distribution actually work, as opposed to how they are supposed to
work, are proving just as informative and surprising. The research of stu-
dents of mine, who are investigating media production in industries as
diverse as magazines, television and news production from Jamaica and
Kenya to India and Singapore, beautifully illuminates that how producers
actually work is as exotic, unexpected and interesting as any classic ethno-
graphic study. Because we have been so focused on the media as struc-
tures and organizations, we have as yet little idea what practices may prove
signiﬁcant.
Among the many practices which make up contemporary mass media,
some are reﬂexive. That is they are about the practices themselves. Just
as a crucial, indeed constitutive, set of media practices frame, represent,
modify and articulate events, actions, texts or what have you, these prac-
tices comment on and articulate these articulatory practices. In this sense
they are meta-practices, meaning not of some higher order, but simply
ones that come after. I shall use ‘commentary’ here as a way in singling
out those kinds of practice, the constitutive purpose of which is to com-
ment on previous practices of articulation. Representation and commen-
tary both supplement and modify what they refer to, but to some extent
in diﬀerent ways. As Goodman noted, representing works by eliminating
most information and by transforming what remains (1968). A picture rep-
resents something as something else. Commentary expands on or modiﬁes
such representations.
AJSS 34,3_f10_492-519III  7/17/06  1:27 PM  Page 506
Just Talk? • 507
Why should this framing and reframing be necessary at all? I take it,
following Quine (1953, 1960), that events and actions are underdetermined.
That is, for any set of facts, there are a variety of ways you can explain,
interpret or understand what is going on, each of which make sense of
those facts, even if in diﬀerent and incompatible ways. One of the more
unnerving experiences of ﬁeldwork by participant-observation is that when
you have observed something important, you have to rush up and ask
what you have just witnessed is actually about. Events do not explain them-
selves. The kinds of closure, well described in studies of television produc-
tion (e.g. Fiske 1987), perhaps especially for the news (Fiske & Hartley
1978), are ways of determining, what is otherwise non-decidable. Even
news stories, arguably among the most highly structured of genres, leave
themselves open to all sorts of possible interpretations. Commentaries often
work to restrict the possibility of dissemination. One way they do so is by
telling you the context or the situation, which is relevant to appreciate 
the facts, tell you what sort of facts they are, the kind and degree of
reliance and the kind of understanding — in other words, how to under-
stand them.
Commentaries do not necessarily over-determine, but may do the
opposite. Confronted with a deﬁnite-looking fact, a commentator may show
that things are not what they seem. The trouble with determinations is
that those who enunciate often do not manage to agree among themselves.
Is it possible to devise a classiﬁcation of kinds of commentary, whether
of Asian media or of media in general? Such an exercise runs the risk of
hypostatizing what are analytical and situational distinctions. Whether some
statement or act is commentative depends on the circumstances of its utter-
ance, for whom it is intended and how it is understood. Something simi-
lar holds for media ‘texts’ more generally. Even Stuart Hall’s argument
that it is possible to distinguish ‘dominant-hegemonic’, ‘negotiated’ and
‘oppositional’ readings of media messages (1980b) presupposes a thorough-
going essentialism (Hobart 2005). Anyway, not only are there presumably
as many ways of commenting as there are ‘illocutionary functions’ (in
Searle’s 1971 sense), but presumably commentaries arguably may be con-
sidered to have multiple functions. Commentary is best left as an analyt-
ical notion.
Re-appraising existing work in terms of commentary already suggests
new possibilities. What are asking viewers their thoughts on Dallas, or con-
ducting questionnaire surveys about Singaporean TV, if not highly struc-
tured invitations to comment? And what are trade journals doing if they
are not adding authoritative or insiders’ commentary? If you stop and think
about it, one of the main activities of the mass media is commenting on
their own productions and those of other media. The variety is surprising.
It ranges from the obvious to the less expected. It would include newspaper
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16 Baudrillard’s argument in The precession of simulacra is about questioning what
determines the relationship between image and reality (1983: 11).
17 I am indebted to an essay, which I unfortunately no longer have, by Adiya
Dev Sood, a student of Ron Inden, which provides an elegant analysis of how we
reviews of ﬁlms and television programmes, the writings of media corre-
spondents, trailers and promotions, trade and in-house journals and fanzines,
ﬁlms and television programmes about making ﬁlms and broadcasts, web
sites for computer and media fans, blogs, chatting about last night’s soap
round the coﬀee machine and much else besides.
Commentaries are remarkably pervasive. But what we actually know
is less the product of carefully tailored footage of images and voices than
of commentaries. No day goes past without politicians, generals and ‘experts’
telling us what is really happening. As we know from the Gulf War and
subsequent wars, what we see on our television screens is not what took
place. As Baudrillard noted (1995), images are selected to confer actuality
and authenticity upon the commentaries.16 The point also emerges from
Fiske and Hartley’s notion of claw-back in news (1978: 81–87), by which
eye-witnesses’ and on-the-spot reporters’ accounts are subordinate to, and
structured by, the studio presenter’s commentary. One person’s fact is some-
one-more-powerful’s commentary. So is it surprising that, when events are
imagined to matter, political commentators — for whom, signiﬁcantly, we
use the term ‘pundits’ — hurl themselves into the breach with a self-
sacriﬁcing devotion worthy of Orientalist imaginings of the Juggernaut?
Who then is empowered to comment, about what and under what
circumstances? What the village commentators had to say was marginal to
much of communications and media studies, not because of what they said
(that — later — excited the publishers), but because of who they were or,
rather, were not. Had they been recognized political commentators (who,
under the New Order, were notably quiet), they would probably have been
hailed for their perspicacity. So what is informed commentary and what
mere opinion, idle speculation or empty chatter would seem to depend on
who says it. No prizes for guessing who usually gets left out.
A point of some signiﬁcance is that an analysis in terms of practice
may ﬁt at least some strands of South Asian philosophical thinking rather
better than the present options. Certainly critical thinking about, and use
of, commentary is highly developed. Indian philosophical thinking about
the nature of language, as exempliﬁed in grammar, translation and com-
mentary, recognizes, as does Balinese, that translation presupposes some
original to be ‘faithful’ to, which is almost by deﬁnition absent. What is
most signiﬁcant though is the idea of after-speech, Anuvada, which involves
a dialogue with some prior text. So elucidation or commentary, vyakarana
(kawi: wyakarana) supplements and becomes part of the text-as-a-whole.17
Far from there being some timeless, generic ‘Asian’ mode of thought into
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would have to rethink our assumptions about language use were we to take Indian
writings on language philosophy seriously.
which we can tap, there seem to have been a host of historically distinct
and indeed rival discours, ranging from the great written philosophical texts
to popular understandings, which are equally coherent nonetheless. By con-
centrating on American and Europe academic thinking, Asian scholars may
be missing extraordinarily rich and diverse discours in their own various
backyards.
Let me now turn to how diﬀerent kinds of media address themselves
to recipients, how they imagine and situate themselves as producers and
the kinds of commentary in which they are engaged. All the materials cited
are about Indonesian television.
The limits of commentary
Many kinds of commentary are too obvious for me to dwell on at length.
Examples are popular political commentary in the form of graﬃti, pop
songs, jokes, rumour, nicknames and a myriad of other forms, which abound
even under conditions of fairly rigorous censorship. Another is the role of
retail magazines, which preview and review ﬁlms and television programmes,
and frame production and personnel. Film magazines, whether for fans or
the general public, have been much more studied than television maga-
zines. For example, for three years before it ceased publication in the sum-
mer of 1997, Vista-TV, a fortnightly up-market Indonesian consumer magazine
extended itself way beyond reviews of programmes to oﬀer a comprehen-
sive critique of state television as ‘the propaganda arm’ of the Suharto gov-
ernment and ‘freedom’, which in this instance meant commercial competition.
Indeed inter-media argument conspicuously includes attempts by the print
media to claw back the enunciative function from television (ﬁlm may try
something similar, Stokes 2000). There has been a long running debate in
the Indonesian broadsheets about the pernicious ‘inﬂuence’ of television
upon the masses (Hobart forthcoming). Such commentaries presuppose that
the facts are not strong enough to speak for themselves, but require fur-
ther articulation. Attempts to determine how readers and audiences are
supposed to understand the mass media is only a small aspect of a more
complex process. To a greater or lesser degree any articulation forecloses
the range of possible responses and disarticulates alternatives. Commentary
may silence as much as it explicates.
Excoriating corruption and staying alive
In Indonesia theatre has conventionally been a means to social criticism.
Even under conditions of harsh repression, mutual knowledge of rhetorical
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forms enabled audiences to understand what actors were implying without
anything explicit being said. Such theatre often resembles a form of guer-
rilla warfare: the actors have packed up and disappeared, leaving only
traces in the memories of audiences. When such theatre is televised and
so recorded, the stakes are raised.
In the summer of 1991, in Bali everyone I knew was talking about
a theatre piece held as part of the annual International Bali Arts Festival
and broadcast on the regional channel of state television. The play was a
Séndratari, a ‘ballet’ spectacular, performed by a large cast, with an orches-
tra and ranks of singers, a theatre form identiﬁable with the New Order
(Hough 1992). The plot drew on a classical episode in the Mahabharata,
the ‘Pandawa Asrama’, when the ﬁve Pandawa brothers are forced into
exile in the forest. All the narration and dancers’ voices were articulated
by a single dalang, or narrator or puppeteer, from one of the two main
performing arts’ academies, KOKAR (Konservatori Karawitan Indonesia,
the Indonesian Conservatory of Music). The dalang, Déwa Madé Sayang,
was not only a superb performer, but also a trenchant critic of abuses by
those in high places. What excited those I spoke to was that he had exco-
riated some of the most senior ﬁgures in Indonesia in front of television
cameras, with two of his targets in the large festival audience.
In the story, before the Pandawa brothers are exiled, they meet the
sage Bagawan Biasa, who advises them how to be good rulers and warns
them of the grave consequences for them and their subjects of doing oth-
erwise. In 1991, when Déwa Madé Sayang performed this piece, com-
mentary on corruption and abuses of position by the President, his family
and government oﬃcials was still relatively muted, although widely rumoured,
despite tight media censorship.
What Bagawan Biasa said was:
If you are the leader of a people, if you rule over them, you cannot live
too well. You must not have too luxurious a life-style, but should live sim-
ply. You are such a leader. Now none of your subjects should be allowed
to be corrupt — that is what you must command. But this must be seri-
ously observed in practice. It should not just take the form of words: you
order the masses to obey, but then it turns out that you did not do so your-
self. That is the diﬃculty of becoming a ruler. It is easy to give orders; it
is hard to put them into practice. That is the ﬁrst thing to grasp.
When a ruler is not honest, the world goes to rot. No way may you do
that. This is what it is to be just. You have to strive to be fair and just to
all of your subjects. On what do you base fairness? On the Four Kinds of
Circumspection: Even-handedness (Sama), Discrimination (Béda), Generosity
(Dana) and Strictness (Danda). Even-handedness: you should give to your sub-
jects equally. The Kingdom of Indraprasta ﬂourishes — who is responsible?
All the subjects, all the oﬃcials, are the reason. All the armed forces are the
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18 I am not guessing on these points. In discussions, Déwa Madé Sayang was
quite explicit about the dangerous task that had been placed on the shoulders of
actors, by the failure of other intellectuals and media ﬁgures to stand up to tyranny.
He was also clear that it was up to individual members of the audience to under-
stand the characters’ words as they saw ﬁt.
reason. Because the ruler treated them all equally. If people should perhaps
struggle to make a living, give those more — that’s called Sama.
He then turned to the arts and urged good leaders not to favour one
group of artists over another. Otherwise those neglected will be angry; gos-
sip will start and the ruler will be discredited. He then remarked that gen-
erosity and punishment should be judged by worth, not by family or favour.
Those I asked agreed that the dalang’s intended targets were President
Suharto and his family, and also the then Governor of Bali, Ida Bagus
Oka, who was widely considered to be very corrupt and to have autho-
rized tourist development that was very destructive of the island as a whole.
The ﬁnal target was Professor Madé Bandem, the director of the rival arts’
academy (STSI, Sekolah Seni Tari Indonesia, the Indonesian Academy of
Performing Arts) whom the dalang held accountable for hogging invitations
for overseas tours.
The dalang placed himself here in a complex relationship with his audi-
ence. He spoke with great enunciative power: with the authority of hav-
ing mastered the texts, of being qualiﬁed to judge their relevance to a
broad range of circumstances. It was the blast of a modern — but also
traditional — intellectual, who took his lords and masters, the intellectuals
who did their bidding and those in opposition who chose to stay quiet, to
task for abject failure. Although the speech was understood as a searing
commentary on the régime, nationally and locally, Déwa Madé Sayang
carefully adhered to the proprieties of commentary on rulership in ancient
India or Bali. At once he condemned a paternalistic corrupt régime, yet
deferred to the audience as to how they chose to interpret his words.18
I trust it is clear by now why I am reluctant to classify kinds of com-
mentary — or indeed what is commentary — because in theatre what is
text and what commentary is ambiguous. By contrast to Euro-American
conventions, where the author or performer to assumed to be the agent,
Javanese and Balinese appreciate the central role of audiences. While actors
and puppeteers often draw more or less implicit comparisons between sit-
uations, problems, moral dilemmas and so forth in performance and bring
about the juxtaposition, it is members of audiences who draw their own
inferences. The commentary is the more elegant and eﬀective for being
implicit, because each person can decide how it applies according to their
own circumstances.
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19 The philosophical approach here is pragmatist, as C.S. Peirce’s analysis of
relations of relations makes clear. Actions and practice are directed. That is they
are directed towards bringing about a state of aﬀairs, which is not already, or
entirely, the case. They are directed to an end outside themselves and so are con-
tingent. The media appear to be the opposite, in that they mediate pre-existing
entities. A moment’s reﬂection suggests though that mediation transforms what it
mediates and so is one kind of practice.
But is this commentary? Everyone I spoke to considered it to be.
Some drew my attention to an aspect I had overlooked. The speech was
not simply a complaint, a public voicing. It was targeted at oﬃcials who
were corrupt, had favoured their families and friends, who had failed to
be just. The expression used was negakin debong, to sit on a wet banana
stem: the moisture slowly seeps through your clothes until you suddenly
realize you are very wet. Any oﬃcial who retained some vestige of human-
ity, on hearing this speech would be forced to reﬂect on their actions.
According to Balinese ideas about meaning (Hobart 1999b), unless a state-
ment has a discernible eﬀect, nothing has happened: it has no meaning.
Whether what the dalang said is commentary or not depends therefore on
whether people paid attention and appreciated it. It is audiences who deter-
mine what is commentary.
We seem to have reached a limiting possibility. Commentary cannot
be singled out as a discriminable class of phenomena — indeed its eﬃcacy
in the example above lies both in it not seeming to be so and being open
to how diﬀerent people may, or may not, choose to relate to it. Whether
something is, or is not, commentary turns out to depend upon the occa-
sion, the particular circumstances and the relationship between the speaker
and diﬀerent members of the audience. How come this has not been more
obvious? It is, I suggest, because of the pervasive substantialism that per-
meates communications studies, which leads to serious diﬃculty in appre-
ciating that we are dealing with ways of relating things (practices). Indeed
the objects themselves are relational, as the verb ‘to mediate’ suggests.
Media are directed to something beyond themselves,19 to the extent that
their objects are not simulacra (which merely makes things worse, Baudrillard
1983).
Why then should there be such a bias towards closure around the
circumstances of production, whether imagined as political-economic deter-
mination of content, ideology, a reiﬁed ‘text’ or ‘encoding’ of messages?
The short, if not pleasant, answer is that it makes life immeasurably more
comfortable for scholars. It shores up the cosy myth of the shared superi-
ority of producers and academic commentators. Ignoring the extent to
which mediation is relational and situational allows academics either to
dispense with the awkward contingencies of production and reception or
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20 The opposition of mass culture and high art sneaks in here. We are happy
to talk about consuming television, game shows or whatever, but to say you went
to the theatre to consume King Lear or the Ramayana sounds odd.
to imagine themselves as knowing subjects suﬃciently universal as to be
able in principle to occupy all relevant positions of producers and audi-
ences anywhere. To the extent that mass communications scholars are func-
tionaries of government and media corporations, this makes a certain sense.
To the extent they claim to be independent, libertarian or radical, they
are fooling no one but themselves.
If the study of mass media is complicated, untidy, partly contingent
and partly unknowable, it is not much of an excuse for intellectual myopia
and recidivism. That existing approaches are inadequate is not a reason
for not rethinking what we do. I think it was J.K. Galbraith who once
remarked that, faced with the overwhelming case for changing your mind
and thinking of reasons not to, most people immediately start thinking up
good reasons.
Just when you thought it was safe to come out
If explanatory closure around production and its objects is inadequate, is
the study of reception the answer? As a comprehensive alternative, the
answer is evidently ‘no’, because it commits an equal and opposite sub-
stantialization. Also reception is the subordinate term in a trichotomy of
production: distribution: reception. The problems of addressing reception
are evident when you consider how pervasive the metaphor or synecdoche
of ‘consumption’ of mass media has become.20 Because mass media are
inter alia businesses, it does not follow that every aspect of it can be explained
as a business. Or, because for expository purposes it may be helpful to
imagine, say, making and appreciating television programmes as a process
of production and consumption does not mean that it is, any more than
because it may be illuminating to treat culture as a text; culture therefore
is a text.
One reason for proposing media-related practices as the object of
study is precisely to break away from the closure which results from impos-
ing models on complex and underdetermined actions. I therefore refer to
such practices as a congeries, because they do not, on this account, form
a system, but are situated, open-ended, labile and changing.
The Governor of Bali awards the prizes
My second example is the lead news item from Balivision, a daily English-
language broadcast in April 1997 by state television in Bali, aimed primarily
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21 The voiceover read:
Yesterday Bali Governor Ida Bagus Oka presented an award to the win-
ner of the Traditional Bali Competition for 1991–1997 at Wantilan Taman
Ayun, Badung. First place went to the Mengwi Traditional Village, sub-dis-
trict of Mengwi, Badung Regency. They received an award and cash totalling
Rp. 4,500,000. In second place was Tegallinggah Traditional Village at
Bedaulu, Gianyar and third place was taken by Betanja, sub-district of South
Denpasar.
The Wayang-Arja Parade Competition was also held. First place went to I
Nyoman Sudana, a puppeteer from Badung Regency; second to I Wayan
Karsa from Bangli; and third place to Déwa Putu Banjar from Gianyar
Regency. The Governor said that we have to protect the negative impact
of tourism by maintaing our customs through Traditional Villages and the
Tri Hita Karana concepts, which include pahyangan, pawongan and paumahan.
He added that participants who did not win this time should try to increase
their development and capabilities.
Brieﬂy, the Tri Hita Karana comprises the three elements of Divinity as all-
pervasive, which make possible the emergence of good in this world, in spirit,
thought and body. This was one of many formalizations necessary for Balinese to
meet the criteria for an accepted religion under the New Order.
at tourists but, for intriguing reasons, with a large Balinese following. The
piece was about the Governor of Bali presiding over the annual competi-
tion to judge the best ‘Traditional Village’ (the translation of désa adat, itself
a hybrid term of Dutch colonial ancestry). As was standard for state tele-
vision, even the Governor did not speak for himself but, just as the dalang
spoke for the entire cast of the Mahabharata, the event relied on voiceover.
Here commentary supplanted the original text entirely. As with most scenes
of government VIPs, the camera followed the movements of the Governor
and his entourage as he met (less) important people against a backdrop of
the well-behaved masses, who exempliﬁed Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’ (1977c).
The commentary was in factual but momentous tone, with the famil-
iar tableau vivant presentation that Kitley has noted attended New Order
ceremonies (1998). There were extensive details of places and people’s
names (where the ceremony happened, which villages and actors won), that
would have been completely meaningless to the intended audience, as would
the extended reference to a recondite religious categorization.21 Commentary
can articulate black as white and square circles. The Governor’s expressed
concern about protecting Bali from the ravages of tourism needs to be set
against television news footage after Suharto’s resignation, when demon-
strating university students singled out the Governor as the ﬁgure primar-
ily responsible for the damage.
It is the ﬁnal line, however, which interests me as it sounds like a
direct quote: ‘Participants who did not win this time should try to increase
their development and capabilities’. This is probably not an infelicity in
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22 For other examples and an extended analysis, see Hobart 2000.
translation.22 A central plank of the New Order was development, which
was to be judged in terms of production, production itself being judged
primarily quantitatively and being applicable to anything. You can —
indeed must — have more tradition, traditional villages and capabilities (the
Indonesian was usually ketrampilan, skills, Balinese being identiﬁed synec-
dochically by their legendary skills in the performing and plastic arts) and
also increase development and modern skills without any contradiction.
The incoherencies of the underlying antagonism of the project of devel-
opment are obvious. It is ‘productivism’ gone mad. There is nothing to
which it does not apply. It was not just the Governor of Bali, but state
television, which was caught up in reiterating an articulation which was at
once absurd and hegemonic. Unfortunately it is not the Governor of Bali
who is alone in being beguiled by the charms of productivism. I leave it
to readers to decide whether their intellectual rears are feeling wet or not.
Production versus seduction
One of the vocal critics of this festishization of production is Baudrillard,
who has opposed production to seduction.
The bourgeois era dedicated itself to nature and production, things quite
foreign and even expressly fatal to seduction. And since sexuality arises, 
as Foucault notes, from a process of production (of discourse, speech or
desire), it is not surprising that seduction has been all the more covered over
(1990: 1)
Seduction, in Baudrillard’s analysis, is emphatically not about sexuality: that
articulation was the bourgeois means of tainting the idea of seduction,
which belongs to a diﬀerent world.
Seduction, however, never belongs to the order of nature, but that of artiﬁce —
never to the order of energy, but that of signs and rituals. This is why all
the great systems of production and interpretation have not ceased to exclude
seduction — to its good fortune — from their conceptual ﬁeld (1990: 2).
Seduction is opposed to quantiﬁability and so to accumulation, power-as-
productive and (in a sideswipe at Lacan) the real.
Seduction is stronger than power because it is reversible and mortal, while
power, like value, seeks to be irreversible, cumulative and immortal . . . It is
the emptiness behind, or at the very heart of power and production; it is
this emptiness that today gives them their last glimmer of reality. Without
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that which reverses, annuls, and seduces them, they would never have had
the authority of reality. The real, moreover, has never interested anyone. It
is a place of disenchantment, a simulacrum of accumulation against death
(1990: 46).
Delightfully, even our fascination with structure and systems turns out not
to be what it seems.
Any system that is totally complicit in its own absorption, such that signs
no longer make sense, will exercise a remarkable power of fascination. Systems
fascinate by their esotericism, which preserves them from external logics. The
absorption of anything real by something self-suﬃcient, and self-destructive,
proves fascinating (1990: 77).
And nowhere is this submission to ritual more apparent in the mod-
ern world than in television, with its repetitive genres and viewing habits.
But in the world of media it is in idols and icons, that seduction reaches
its peak: in the artiﬁcial perfection of the sign.
Undoubtedly the best example of this is to be found in the only important
constellation of collective seduction produced by modern times, that of ﬁlm
stars or cinema idols (1990: 94).
Baudrillard oﬀers a persuasive account of the limits of production as the
dominant order of modern bourgeois society. But quite what is seduction
all about? Nowhere does Baudrillard deﬁne seduction, partly of course
because deﬁnition is an antithetical process to seduction, which stands
opposed to production as momentary, reversible, weak, fragile and unsta-
ble. It is potentially revolutionary, as it undermines the dominant orders
of society — humour and ridicule being examples. It is ritualistic, agonis-
tic, above all linked to artiﬁce, appearances, illusions and the joy of sur-
faces. Here Baudrillard echoes other writers from Foucault’s (1990) scepticism
about the claims of interpretation as discovering truth in deep foundations
to Sontag (1961) in calling for an appreciation of things as they appear,
which signiﬁcantly she calls an ‘erotics’. It is no accident that cartoonists
and comedians are among the ﬁrst targets of authoritarian régimes.
The limits of imagination
To return to my starting point, the Balinese villagers with whom I have
talked over the years about television-watching were perceptive commen-
tators on how the mass media worked in Indonesia. They were acutely
aware of the means by which they were being disarticulated. And they
were by turns movingly self-critical and detached about how, despite them-
selves, they could be seduced by television and advertisements (Hobart
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2001). What ordinary people make of, and do with, mass media tends to
prove diﬃcult for the over-articulated imaginations of most academics, the
very rigorousness of whose training makes thinking outside the conﬁnes of
accepted institutional practice unnecessary, inappropriate or downright dan-
gerous. We are facing the limits of reifying production — and, equally,
distribution and reception — as objects of study.
Such analyses fail to consider the mass media as practices. A stress
on practice — and so relationships, because practices by deﬁnition relate
agents and events — changes our object of study. Practice may be the
meeting point between empirical and critical approaches because, signiﬁcantly,
it includes the practices of media practitioners, audiences and the researchers
themselves as part of the problem. In so doing it marks a shift from the
conventional hierarchy of the knower and her categories as being consid-
ered superior to those of the known. Film and television producers, let
alone audiences, across Asia are constantly articulating the world in ways
most academics have simply never imagined possible, and so have never
bothered to inquire about. The result is that they have been deaf to a dis-
cours going on all around them every day. It would be sadly facile to carry
on dismissing it as just talk.
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